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ON INFERENTIALLY REMEMBERING  
THAT P 
Andrew NAYLOR 
ABSTRACT: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A 
Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too 
strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential 
memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of 
inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis 
presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. 
Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A 
remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had 
prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.  
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According to Sven Bernecker in his recent book on memory,1 most of our 
memories are inferential: they are causally based on (conscious or unconscious) 
inferential reasoning. Inferential memories deserve philosophical attention in 
light of evidence from cognitive psychology that remembering is often a 
constructive process in which inferential reasoning plays an important part. 
Although Bernecker devotes most of his book to memories that are 
non-inferential, when he does turn to inferential memories, he sets forth an 
adaptation of the following account tentatively given by Arnold Cusmariu:  
Where p, q, and r are logically inequivalent propositions, S remembers impurely 
that p iff (i) S remembers that q & (ii) S knows now that r & (iii) S knows now 
that p inferentially from (i) and (ii), & (iv) the conjunction of q and r entails but 
is not entailed by p.2 
Because Bernecker is opposed to epistemic theories of memory, according to 
which one remembers that p only if one knows and/or justifiedly believes that p, 
he modifies Cusmariu’s account as follows: 
[W]here p, q, and r are logically inequivalent propositions, S [at t2] inferentially 
remembers that p only if: ... (i) S remembers at t2 that q & (ii) S comes to truly 
                                                                
1 Sven Bernecker, Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25. 
2 Arnold Cusmariu, “A Definition of Impure Memory,” Philosophical Studies 38 (1980): 307. 
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think at t2 that r & (iii) S comes to truly think at t2 that p inferentially from (i) 
and (ii), & (iv) the conjunction of q and r entails but is not entailed by p.3 
The account is meant to apply, in the first instance, to cases of what Malcolm 
labels ‘impure memory’, where, for example, S at t1 sees a bird but does not then 
know that it is a cardinal; later, at t2, S remembers from t1 that he saw a bird 
having a certain appearance, learns that birds with that appearance are cardinals, 
and thereupon realizes that he saw a cardinal. If one says “S remembers that he 
saw a cardinal,” this is elliptical for “S remembers that he saw a bird having a 
certain appearance and now he truly thinks that it was a cardinal.” 4 
Condition (iv) exposes Bernecker’s account to a counterexample that shows 
the account to be too strong. Let conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) be met as follows. At t1 
Judy sees a skunk through an open window, but because it is twilight she comes to 
believe only that she sees a small animal, either a cat or a skunk. Shortly 
thereafter, at t2, with the animal no longer in view, she remembers that 
(q)  either she saw a cat outside or she saw a skunk outside. 
Then, catching a whiff of a skunk, she comes to truly think that 
(r) there was a skunk outside. 
Thereupon she comes to truly think, inferentially from her memory that q and her 
thought that r, that 
(p)  she saw a skunk outside. 
(Her inference here is abductive: it is an inference to the best explanation from 
her memory that q and her true thought that r to her true thought that p.) The 
example, I take it, is an instance of Judy’s inferentially remembering that (p) she 
saw a skunk outside. However, Bernecker’s condition (iv), that the conjunction of 
q and r entails but is not entailed by p, is not met – first because while (in the 
situation described) the conjunction of q and r provides good reason to think that 
p, it does not entail p, since it is remotely possible that the skunk she smelled was 
not the animal she saw; and second because p does entail the conjunction of q and 
r, since p entails r as well as the disjunctive proposition q . 
Bernecker’s condition (iv) may be emended – to allow S to inferentially 
remember that p in the case about Judy and, more generally, to accommodate 
relations of support in addition to entailment – as follows: 
                                                                
3 Bernecker, Memory, 96. 
4 Norman Malcolm, “A Definition of Factual Memory,” in his Knowledge and Certainty: Essays 
and Lectures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 223-224. 
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(iv′) the conjunction of q and r (but neither q nor r alone) entails p, or provides 
inductive or abductive support for p.   
This is an important emendation to Bernecker’s account because accounts of 
memory retrieval as a reconstructive, inferential process typically speak of 
processes such as pulling together “bits and pieces of information from various 
sources,”5 or “the filling in of a pattern on the basis of  particular (perhaps partial 
or distorted) input,”6 or the memory system making “its best guess as to what [a] 
scene must have looked like,”7 all of which are closer to abductive inference than 
to the type of simple deductive inference that occurs in Malcolm’s case about the 
cardinal. 
Inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) 
with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one 
has that r. But what about the memory that q? Is it inferential or non-inferential? 
While there may be radical constructivist views which hold that all remembering 
is inferential, that is not Bernecker’s view since all but a few pages of his book deal 
with non-inferential remembering. So let’s look at what Bernecker says about 
non-inferential remembering. For present purposes, what Bernecker requires for S 
at t2 to non-inferentially remember that p amounts to the following:  
(Non-Inf) S at t2 has a representation that p (p being a true proposition) which 
representation is memory-connected to a sufficiently similar 
representation that p* which S had at t1.8  
(p* and p are sufficiently similar just in case p* relevantly entails p. Bernecker’s 
example: S at t1 believes that (p*) Caesar was assassinated, but at t2 remembers only 
that (p) Caesar died of unnatural causes; because p is relevantly entailed by p*, S’s 
state at t2 counts as remembering that p, provided condition (Non-Inf) as a whole 
is satisfied.9) But, according to Bernecker, S need not, either at t2 or at t1, 
justifiedly believe or have justifiedly believed (even prima facie) that p or that p*, 
or have or have had any belief at all that p or that p*.10  
                                                                
5 Daniel L. Schachter and Donna Rose Addis, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive 
Memory: Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future,” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B 362 (2007): 773. 
6 John Sutton, “Memory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/memory/: 28. 
7 Kourken Michaelian, “The Information Effect: Constructive Memory, Testimony, and 
Epistemic Luck,” Synthese 190 (2013): 2444. 
8 See Bernecker, Memory, 34–42. 
9 Bernecker, Memory, 222. 
10 See Bernecker, Memory, 71–96. 
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A variation on the case about Judy points to a shortcoming in Bernecker’s 
account of non-inferentially remembering that p. Just when (at t1) a skunk is 
passing by his window Joe has a veridical hallucination as of just such a skunk 
passing by – in other words, Joe has a hallucination that just happens to match 
what he would otherwise see looking out his window – whereupon he comes to 
believe that (p*) a skunk passed by. Joe forms this belief despite his knowing that 
he had ingested a strong hallucinogen and that moments earlier it had seemed to 
him that an ostrich and then a cow and then a lion had passed by. Joe’s true belief 
that he had ingested a strong hallucinogen is a non-misleading defeater of his 
prima facie justification for believing that a skunk passed by. Nevertheless, Joe 
goes on believing that a skunk passed by. Later, at t2, Joe has a belief, suitably 
memory-connected to his belief at t1 (the time at which he hallucinated), that (p) 
a skunk passed by. Bernecker’s requirement for non-inferentially remembering 
that p – (Non-Inf) above – is satisfied. Yet it is hardly the case that Joe remembers 
that a skunk passed by. If I am right about this then Bernecker’s account of non-
inferentially remembering that p is inadequate as it stands.  
What needs to be added to (Non-Inf), it seems to me, is a further 
requirement that S at t1 had prima facie justification to believe that p*. Is it 
necessary for such justification to have been undefeated? If so, this would explain 
Joe’s failure at t2 to remember that (p) a skunk passed by, since there was a 
non-misleading defeater of his justification for believing that p*. Such a 
requirement, however, would be too strong. For S may well remember that p in 
certain cases where S’s prima facie justification to believe that p* was defeated, 
provided that all such defeaters were misleading. Suppose, in contrast to Joe, that 
at t1 Jane falsely believed that she had ingested a strong hallucinogen; suppose too 
that she actually saw that (p*) a skunk passed by, and that she believed that this 
was so despite her belief that she had ingested the hallucinogen. If, at t2, by which 
time she has forgotten about the hallucinogen, she believes that (p) a skunk passed 
by on the basis of what she saw at t1, we allow that she remembers that (p) a 
skunk passed by. The called-for addition to (Non-Inf) is: 
S at t1 had prima facie justification to believe that p*, and any defeaters of such 
justification were misleading.11 
With this requirement added, (Non-Inf) is strong enough to rule out Joe’s case as 
an instance of remembering that p without also ruling out Jane’s case. 
                                                                
11 Andrew Naylor, “Remembering without Knowing – Not without Justification,” Philosophical 
Studies 49 (1986): 304.  
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Such a requirement, in turn, places the following constraint on Bernecker’s 
account of inferential memory: insofar as S at t2 inferentially remembers that p, S 
at t1 must have had prima facie justification to believe at least those components of 
q* that entail the proposition that q which condition (i) says S remembers at t2, 
and it must be that any defeaters of such justification were misleading. (If S’s 
memory that q is itself inferential, this same constraint applies to S’s inferentially 
remembering that q.) 
In concluding, let’s consider the following case which might seem to pose a 
difficulty for Bernecker’s account in terms of conditions (i–iii) and (iv′) if these are 
taken to be jointly sufficient for inferentially remembering that p. Suppose that at 
t2 Jessica remembers from t1 that (q) Colorado borders Kansas, learns and thus 
comes to truly think that (r) her friend Jeff won the Epistemology Prize, and 
comes to truly think, inferentially from her memory that q and her thought that r, 
that (p) Colorado borders Kansas and some friend of hers won the Epistemology 
Prize. Clearly, Jessica at t2 does not inferentially remember that (p) Colorado 
borders Kansas and some friend of hers won the Epistemology Prize.12 Yet 
conditions (i–iii) and (iv′) are all satisfied.  
Now Bernecker may be able to rule out this case – and other such cases 
where p is a ‘hodgepodge conjunction’ – by appealing to his ‘entailment condition’ 
(EC), which, he claims,13 applies not only to non-inferentially remembering that p 
but also to inferentially remembering that p: 
(EC) p (the proposition S represents at t2) is relevantly entailed by p* (the 
proposition S represented at t1). 
Letting p* have the same content as q (i.e. Colorado borders Kansas), p* does not 
relevantly entail p (i.e. Colorado borders Kansas and some friend of hers (Jessica’s) 
won the Epistemology Prize) – which, Bernecker can say, is why Jessica does not 
inferentially remember that p. 
Making (EC) an additional necessary condition for inferentially 
remembering that p may work well enough in this case about Jessica, but it is 
questionable that it works as intended in all cases. It does not work, for instance, 
in the case where Judy does inferentially remember that (p) she saw a skunk 
outside; for in this case (EC) is not satisfied. To see this, let p* (the proposition 
Judy represented at t1) have the same content as q (the proposition she 
remembered at t2, i.e. either she saw a cat outside or she saw a skunk outside). 
However, p* does not, as it should for Bernecker’s account to allow this case, 
                                                                
12 Thanks to Earl Conee for suggesting this type of example. 
13 Bernecker, Memory, 226–27. 
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relevantly entail p (i.e. she saw a skunk outside), the proposition she inferentially 
remembers. So (EC) is not a necessary condition for inferentially remembering 
that p.14 
                                                                
14 I am grateful to Sven Bernecker and Arnold Cusmariu for helpful comments. 
